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8 May 1987
NAMIBIA: DEPENDENCE, DESTABILISATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT
By Reginald Herbold Green
A man who has inherited a tumbledown cottage has to live in 
even worse conditions while he is rebuilding it and making 
a decent home for himself.
- Mwalimu J. K. Nyerere
Dependence: Permutation on a Theme
Namibia is dependent in several distinct ways: first as a small country with
inherently unbalanced resources; second as a country with a 
peripheral/colonial structure of production and of middle and high level 
personnel; third as an occupied territory of South Africa.
This paper represents the author's personal views, and do not necessarily «oWd- 
OXFAM's position.
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Namibia possesses major deposits of uranium ore and of diamonds, substantial 
base metal and coal deposits and - probably - moderate natural gas fields. As 
90 per cent of uranium is used to produce electricity and Namibia has 
hydroelectric - and potential coal and gas sources the only use for uranium 
oxide is export. Similarly Namibia can produce up to 20 per cent of the 
world’s gem diamonds but has no domestic market. Even for copper, lead, zinc, 
tin and salt its domestic demand - even with a reasonably large manufacturing 
sector - could not equal production. While power and mining could use some 
coal and gas, their optimal development would also involve exports of coal and 
ammonia/urea (from gas).
Similarly Namibia has large areas moderately well suited to producing cattle 
and sheep (especially karakul sheep). Even with adequate diets the production 
of meat would remain grossly in excess of demand and the domestic demand for 
karakul is nil. The hides and wool should be - as they are not - inputs into 
leather products and textiles but again ouput would exceed domestic demand. 
If - or with proper conservation measures when - the fish stocks revive, 
fishing and fish processing will exhibit the same natural imbalance.
A small African economy can build up a not insignificant manufacturing sector 
- vide Botswana. But it will have many gaps because of lack of domestic 
inputs and/or economies of scale. By the same token - again as in Botswana - 
a substantial proportion of output is likely to be exported.
However, Namibia today is almost a parody of an economy that produces what it 
does not use and uses what it does not produce. Of physical goods produced 
about 90 per cent are exported and of those consumed about 90 per cent are 
imported. That is the result of an outlook similar to the description of
I
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British colonies ("plantations”) given by James Mill as places in which it was 
convenient for the UK to carry on some activities not as territorial economies 
in their own right.
Reallocation of priorities, supporting resources and prices could result in
Namibia booming self-sufficient in basic food and provide a basis for food
processing for the domestic market. More construction material (e.g. cement),
intermediate goods (e.g. glass), light engineering (e.g. equipment and
machinery maintenance and repair) and basic consumer goods (e.g. clothing and 
perhaps textile production) are possible. Meat, fish, leather and wool
manufacturing could be built up for the local as well as the export market as 
could - probably - coal raining and natural gas based ammonia/urea production.
Similarly institutional dependence on externally (South African) based bodies
could be reduced. Nor is the situation in which 60 per cent of managerial,
administrative, professional, para professional and skilled posts (70 per cent 
excluding nursing and teaching) are held by whites who are about 5 per cent
of the population natural. Both are colonial patterns.
Third, Namibia is dependent on the Republic of South Africa in ways
deliberately designed to maximise the benefits to the RSA economy from holding 
the territory. For example, most of its external trade is by land and through 
or with South Africa although it has (in law and right despite South African 
claims to the contrary) a natural deep water port and South Africa is not in
general a low cost supplier. What it sells to RSA is again determined by RSA
convenience/profit not Namibian. The dominance of South Africans among the 
expatriate (as opposed to permanent settler) half of the white personnel is 
equally artificial.
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Thus Namibia is an economy likely always to have a high ratio of external 
trade to output and use. It could reduce this especially in respect to food 
and selected manufactures and substitute interdependency in some sectors via 
regional links but full physical self-reliance is not a practicable goal - as 
opposed to the economic self-reliance of being able to pay its own way.
However, located on the sea and hundreds of miles from any major RSA area of 
economic activity, Namibia's economic (trade, transport, institutions, 
personnel) dependence on South Africa is totally artificial. What was built 
up by colonial policy can be reversed by national - at a cost and over time - 
perhaps rather more rapidly in Namibia than in several other Southern African 
states. Or rather it can be if South Africa does not use force to prevent 
such restructuring away from concentrated, unilateral Namibian dependence on 
RSA.
Inequitable and Moribund; The Colonial Economy
The main national accounting data - population, economically active people, 
output, external trade, budget, income distribution - data are set out in the 
tables annexed to this paper. What follows is a very condensed summary of the 
story they tell about the colonial political economy's trajectory and present 
state.
The colonial political economy of Namibia has always been a political economy 
of theft. Land; cattle, independence, mineral rights, freedom of residence 
and movement, the right of workers and peasants to organise for their own
I
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interests - all were taken away by force.
However, until the late 1940s Namibia was of no real economic significance - 
even to South Africa. The rapid growth of its mineral, ranching and fishing 
sectors took place in about a quarter century after 1950. In 1977 the economy 
reached a plateau in respect to total output and stayed on it to 1979 before 
falling steadily through 1983 and levelling off again over 1984-1986.
Over the boom period Namibia as a source of raw materials exploited with cheap 
black labour, a captive market for South Africa and an employment outlet for 
(white) South Africans was highly profitable. That is not the case since the 
early 1980s. Now South Africa probably loses on the order of $1,500 million 
(R 3»000 million) a year by fighting its ongoing war against the Liberation 
Movement.
Why the economic debacle? The reasons are multiple - the war is 
not the only one. Namibia is a mineral based economy. Since 1975 most 
minerals have faced severe price falls. Uranium oxides price fell later. 
Diamonds did not fall in price, but to sustain prices output was cut by over 
half. Very few SSA economies have fared well since 1979 and in one sense 
Namibia is a fairly typical African economy. Another sense in which it is 
typical is that it experienced - and is again experiencing - prolonged drought 
which over 1976-1984 cut constant price agricultural (largely ranching) output 
55 per cent. The collapse of fishing relates to the occupation regime»albeit 
not to war» but to the war of overfishing it allowed.
But the war has contributed to crippling the economy and prevented 
recovery. It has totally destroyed enterprise optimism and nearly totally 
wiped out settler confidence in the future. Gross Constant price investment 
has fallen by over a third since 1977 and net investment may well be negative 
overall and certainly is negative for the enterprise sector. Further the war 
has led directly to the departure of up to MO per cent of the white ranching 
community. Finally fighting the war and trying to buy a Namibian support base 
has wrecked the fiscal position of Namibia and made it a millstone around the 
South African Treasury's neck.
As noted earlier, Namibia has a very unbalanced economy. Mining accounts for 
24 per cent, ranching and fishing (including processing for about 15 per 
cent), other manufacturing, electricity and water and construction for 3 to 4 
per cent each and services for 51 per cent. 1983 exports were 32 per cent 
uranium oxide, 25 per cent diamonds (reversed by 1986), 21 per cent other 
metals and minerals, 8 per cent ranching products and 9 per cent fish 
products. Final goods imports plus fuel were over 85 per cent of total 
imports and intermediate inputs into production under 15 per cent.
While even in 1985 Namibia had a per capita output of R 1,600 (about $800) 
about two thirds of all Namibians lived in absolute poverty. Part of the 
reason is that total recorded and estimated profits and salary remittances out 
of Namibia even in a depression have regularly exceeded 20 per cent of gross 
domestic product. However, the dominant reason is radical inequality of 
income distribution. White household incomes amount to 58 per cent of total 
household incomes for about 10 per cent of households - averaging over R20,000 
in 1983. A smaj.1 black elite (12¿ per cent of households) average about 
R6,000 and had 21 per cent of household income; the same as the poor worker
i
and peasant households (77¿ per cent of all households) who averaged only 
R 1 ,000 or one sixth black elite and one twentieth of white incomes.
Over the period since 1977-1985 real production per capita - constant price
output adjusted for worsening terms of trade, i.e. more Namibian exports
needed to pay for any given volume of imports - has fallen about 37£ to 40 per 
cent. Investment per capita has declined over 60 per cent, private
consumption over 40 per cent but general government has risen over 60 per cent 
per capita.
This pattern has led to a fiscal debacle. Until 1980 Namibia's budget was in
fact sound with a surplus of recurrent revenue over recurrent expenditure
standard (and sometimes total recurrent and capital spending was so covered). 
Higher black wages and salaries, ethnic 'administrations', 'defence' bills and 
the like ended that period. In the years before 1986/87 external borrowing 
rose to over R250 million a year. With some control over expenditure and a 
sharp recovery in diamond profits (which are heavily taxed) the 1986/87 budget 
may be close to balanced but includes about 20 per cent South African
transfers (excluding customs and excise duties). Without these the fact that 
1983 - 1987 has only narrowed, not closed, the fiscal gap would be clearer.
Namibia's external balance - to the extent it can be reconstructed - regularly 
shows a viable trade surplus although in 1983 invisible (service) imports were 
enough above exports to make the overall trade balance appear negative. By
1985 devaluation of the rand had boosted export earnings (in rand terms) and
caused some contraction in import demand so that a clearly positive trade 
balance ensued. The dependence of trade on South Africa is very marked for 




Occupation Infrastructure for Economic Destabilisation
South Africa has of course destabilised Namibia's economy by occupation, 
exploitation, repression and war. However, the present point is that it has 
laid the foundations for destabilising independent Namibia. On the Southern 
African record there is every reason to assume it will seek to activate that 
infrastructure for destablisation to deter, hamper or block Namibian efforts 
to reduce dependence on South Africa. These building blocks for destructive 
engagement with an independent Namibia are in large part the result of 
policies designed to hold Namibia, but forward planning on how to manipulate 
an independent Namibia has also played a role. In any event what matters is 
what has been created.
First, South Africa has created for Namibia an 'external debt' which by the 
end of 1983 was of the order of R500 million, with interest and debt service 
of about R100-120 million a year and a rate of increase of perhaps R250-300 
million a year. By mid-1986 it may well have been approaching R1,000 million 
principal (TOO per cent of export earnings) and R200-250 million annual 
overall debt service (20-25 per cent). In part this represents nominal 
transfers of railway, power,dieted mining assets from South African entities 
to the occupation regime along with parallel debt liabilities to South Africa 
for their 'purchase'. This creates a slightly more plausible 'external debt' 
bill as well as raising its level. To accept that debt would cripple the 
economy of an independent Namibia. To repudiate it - despite the 1971 
International Court of Justice opinion which clearly renders it legally void -
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might damage Namibia’s external financial standing and access to credit.
Second, it has created a budgetary shambles both in terms of actual revenue 
and expenditure, and, even more, in the appearance of total, permanent 
insolvency. The attempt to cast Namibia as a fiscal 'basket case' not worth 
assisting is quite clear in some of P. W. Botha's statements on the cost of 
the territory to South Africa. So is the warning that instant cut-offs of 
South African funding before a new tax and expenditure system was in place 
could cause a breakdown of governmental ability to act. Ironically RSA's own 
financial needs have apparently halted this rake's progress and 1983-86 has 
been marked by less profligacy.
Third, in the multiple-tiered and racial administration, South Africa has 
created a bureaucratic monstrosity. It is not merely politically unacceptable 
as an entrenchment of racism; it is corrupt, wasteful and unable to operate 
competently for any purpose, as even the South Africans have admitted. While 
these functional weaknesses are a drawback to South Africa in occupation; at 
independence they will threaten the independent state with paralysis. South 
Africa can enhance this paralysis by the sudden withdrawal of key technical, 
professional and administrative staff.
Fourth, the efforts of large companies, and especially the occupation regime, 
to create a stable and skilled black labour force loyal to them will leave a 
potential time bomb. The professional and skilled/semi-skilled workers are 
not politically loyal to South Africa. However, their pay scales of R5,000- 
12 ,500 a year pose serious problems. it is economically impossible to 
generalise these income levels to all workers. Even if it were, the effect on 
rural-urban income inequality and on siphoning off resources otherwise
-9-
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available for rural development would be politically dangerous and socially 
irresponsible. To limit these scales to certain posts would both entrench 
massive intra-African income inequality and make expansion of basic public 
services fiscally impossible. To sustain them for present African job-holders 
only, with new entrants on lower scales, would create great bitterness 
among returning war veterans. To cut them - by direct scale changes or
even by a freeze - would at best lead to loss of morale and resentment that 
gains ’won’ from the South African occupiers were promptly eroded at 
independence.
The bantustan politicians, clerks and home guards pose a different set of 
problems. Their 'services’, unlike those of the professional and skilled 
personnel, are not needed. But if they are fired they will provide the core 
for a political fifth column which could provide a focal point for discontent 
or the basis of a 'hired gun' insurgency, like the Mozambican bandidos armados 
(MNR).
Fifth, by remaining in illegal occupation of Walvis Bay - Namibia's only deep 
water port - after independence, South Africa could ensure that it has a choke 
point. Until Namibia creates alternative ports (for example, by reactivating 
Swakopmund) or gains access to others (via Angola or Zambia), South Africa at 
Walvis Bay controls its basic access to the outside world and can prevent 
diversification of trade and transport away from South Africa.
Sixth, similar consideration apply to road and rail transport. Rolling stock 
is highly mobile and, like many of the lorry fleets, is South African owned. 
Major repair facilities are in Upington in South Africa, or Walvis Bay, but 
not Windhoek. Roads and rail lines without lorries and rolling stock, and
«r
without maintenance and repair capacity, do not constitute a transport system.
Seventh, the sea bastion of South Africa's Orange River line at Alexander's 
Bay is within mortar or launch range of Namibia's premier economic asset - the 
Oranjemund diamond complex. Furthermore, the 'boundary' of the Walvis Bay 
'enclave' is within range of the alternative port at Swakopmund. The 
implications are only too clear.
Guarding Against Destabilisation; Reducing Dependence
This infrastructure for destabilisation is alarmingly comprehensive and 
strong. However, it is not invulnerable. For each of its seven prongs there 
are at least partially ways of blunting them. Not incidentally these would 
also reduce dependence on South Africa.
First, most of the 'external debt' is to the South African government or held 
by South African financial institutions. The latter portion is fully 
guaranteed by the South African government. Since the World Court decision 
any lender has been on notice that South Africa's occupation is illegal and 
that it has no power to incur obligations on behalf of Namibia. Further, 
under the Vienna Convention on Succession of States, on independence a colony 
receives all of the colonial state's assets in the colony and/or created for 
the colony's use with no obligation to pay the former colonial state nor to 
meet any exteranl debts it may have incurred in the colony's name. Therefore, 
Namibia will be in a strong legal and practical position to deny liability - 
as well as having a very strong moral case. If it acts along those lines it 
will not have the crushing debt burden and dependence on aid that weighs
-11-
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heavily on many African states today.
Second and third, financial and administrative reform, training and upgrading 
Namibian personnel and - where needed - securing replacement expatriates are 
Namibian priorities. Without administrative reform the state will not be able 
to act effectively to further its goals. Without fiscal reform - especially 
cutting wasteful or white centred expenditure and diverting part of the 
savings to universal access basic services - it will either go bankrupt or be 
unable to build up basic (e.g. health, education, water, extension) services 
to black Namibians. Building up Namibian capacities is a precondition for 
real Namibian control of state or economy while radically altering the 
numbers, sources and uses of expatriates is key to having cooperation with, 
not sabotage of Namibian aims. Planning in respect to administration, 
services and finance as well as actual training can to a substantial degree be 
done before independence. Whether desirable or not a leisurely reform, 
modification and phase out pattern such as typified most ex-British colonies 
after independence is not an option which exists.
Fourth, SWAPO can - indeed will need to - formulate an incomes policy setting 
out the case for lesser black/black as well as black/white inequality of 
incomes and the reasons Namibians cannot and should not expect (white) South 
African salary scales. Frank dialogue with skilled Namibians now in Namibia 
(and pre-independence training in self-discipline for those educated in exile) 
can achieve at least a suspension of disbelief and cooperation by many of the 
Namibians affected. In respect to ’homeguards’, Southwest African military 
personnel and puppet politicians there can hardly be an economic solution nor 
an effective appeal to nationalist ideals - the problem is ultimately a 
security one. This situation will force Namibia to face the fact that high
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salaries mean high inequality, low wages and low peasant incomes - a fact many 
African states took over a decade to perceive while entrenched interests in 
inequality were built.
Fifth, Walvis Bay is Namibian. It was created for Namibia and for fifty years 
was administered as part of Namibia. Both the legal doctrine of estoppel and 
the Vienna Convention on Succession point to the strength of Namibia's legal 
as well as moral position. In any event, interim port facilities could be set 
in operation within months and a new (or reborn) Swakopmund/Swakop estuary 
port built in two years. While not an immediate priority if Walvis Bay is 
secured, new deeper and shorter channel facilities will be needed by or soon 
after 1995 in any event. The rephasing would constrain other programmes but 
far less than would seeking to operate through a South African controlled 
Walvis Bay.
Sixth, vehicles, rolling stock and associated maintenance/repair units can be 
in place within months. That, however, is true only if possible needs are 
identified before independence and assistance sources programmed to respond at 
once to requests.
Seventh, action on the economic front cannot prevent cross border shelling or 
raids. That is a military and diplomatic task - albeit one which needs to be 
conducted with regard to what economic targets most need protecting. However, 
some ecorpmic actions can help. Leaving De Beers as manager marketing agent 
and perhaps part owner of Consolidated Diamond Mines should deter South 
African attacks. Similarly Dutch or Nordic port construction and interim port 
management personnel would probably reduce the likelihood of South African 
attacks.
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Thus, it is possible to contain and to erode South Africa's base for 
destabilising Namibia. In large part the measures needed to do so are ones 
which will reduce dependence on South Africa and increase the coherence and 
pace of development.
What Meaning - Here and Now
The driving force and design for dependence reduction - especially but not
only on the Republic of South Africa (to use SADCC's wording) - must be the
Namibian people and their leadership acting through an independent Namibian 
state. Foreign well-wishers neither should nor can act as resident platonic 
guardians nor long distance teleprompters.
That, however, is very different from saying Namibia does not need supporters 
- here and now.
The general issue of support for a genuine decolonisation and free/fair 
elections so Namibians can choose their own government is outside the scope of 
this paper and is taken as agreed. However, it is relevant in certain 
respects. The less 'safeguards' (for South African and foreign firms) or 
'barriers’ (to Namibian action) are imposed at independence the less delayed 
and costly will be dependence reduction. An evident point is insistence on
the territorial integrity of Namibia - i.e. that Walvis Bay is part of
Namibia, not as RSA would have it a suburb of Capetown. A second is that the 
longer the dead hand of the occupation lasts the weaker the economy will be 
and the more destabilising influences will have been built into it to deter
r
and/or sabotage dependence reducing actions.
The immediate inputs into future Namibian dependence reduction that can be 
made by supporters now are to personpower and information development. SWAPO 
both runs training programmes and production units in exile and is
systematically educating thousands of Namibians at secondary and tertiary 
level in many parts of the world. These programmes need funding (in many 
cases - e.g. primary health care) quite small contributions help. They also 
need places and funds for students abroad - relatively few are in the UK
because fees are high and scholarships few.
Knowledge development is a somewhat more specialised area. Everyone can 
contribute something for programmes and many can lobby (whether universities, 
foundations, churches, trade unions, the government or the European 
Parliament) to support training for Namibians. Researchers and policy 
alternative drafters are by their nature rarer. But they should not be as 
rare as they are. More scholars and professionals should concern themselves 
with Namibia and its needs and make their findings and ideas freely available 
to the people of Namibia and their organisations.
Outside Namibia that means to SWAPO. Inside - especially re programme support 
- there are practical problems. A war, a brutal occupation regime and overt
suppression of SWAPO activities do limit what SWAPO can do inside occupied
Namibia. Here there may be room for some action via genuinely Namibian 
independent bodies with some freedom of manoeuvre grudgingly left them by the 
regime. In practice that means the member churches of the Namibian National 
Council of Churches (Lutheran, Catholic, Anglican, African Methodist 
Episcopal) and - perhaps - independent trade unions (i.e. not company unions).
-15-
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Care is needed - including advice from SWAPO - to be sure one is supporting 
real Namibian priorities and acting through channels that are Namibian and not 
occupation manipulated.
Finally now is not too soon to put the case for prompt and generous support to 
Namibia at independence. Technical assistance, personnel, replacement
vehicles for those RSA will drive or haul away, market access (e.g. for beef), 
places for training, soft financed assistance for reconstuction and dependence 
reduction will all be needed. Unless they are planned in advance they will 
not be available on a timely basis or in adequate quantities.
This is not a field for government action alone. On the one hand the EEC and
on the other voluntary agencies (especially churches and trade unions) should 
play substantial roles. For example, if Namibia needs 75 committed expatriate 
doctors rapidly at independence, VSO, the British Council of Churches and its
members and Catholic Church bodies such as CAFOD and CRS might well be able to
respond more adequately and rapidly (preferably in collaboration with their 
counterparts in other countries) than WHO or governments.
Namibia needs independence and it needs to be able to use it to free itself 
from dependence on South Africa. It is for supporters of Namibia to learn 
what needs to be done by them and set out to do it.
-17-
Table 1
Population Distribution Estimates 1980-1983 
(people 000)















Rundu1 119 6 125 125 8 133
Oshakati1 595 18 613 615 28 643
Opuwo/Opuhoho ̂ 15 5 20 16 5 21
North 767 36 803 (61) 796 49 845 (60)
Tsumkwe”' 1 1 2 1 1 2
Okakarara1 30 11 41 32 12 45
Khorixas1 17 12 29 18 13 31
Gibeon1 11 5 16 12 6 18
Rehoboth 18 14 32 19 15 31*
Central/Southern
’Homelands’ 77 43 120 (9 ) 83 47 130 (9)
Swakopmund 2 16 18 2 20 22
Walvis Bay 0 20 10 0 19 19
2Luderitz 1 16 17 1 16 17
Coast 3 52 55 (4) 3 55 58 (4)
Tsumeb 10 15 25 12 13 25
Out jo 7 4 11 8 4 12
Groot Fontein 12 12 24 14 14 28
Otjiwarongo 8 12 20 8 13 21
Omaruru 3 4 7 3 4 7
Okahandja 8 8 15 8 9 17
Gobabis 20 7 27 21 7 28
Karibib 6 6 12 6 6 12
Windhoek 11 124 135 13 150 163
North/Central ’White' 




Mariental 14 10 24 15 11 26
Maltahoho 3 2 5 4 2 6
Keetmanshoop 7 13 20 7 15 22
Bethanie 2 1 3 2 1 3
Karasburg 5 6 11 6 6 12
South 'White'
Ranching Districts 31 32 63 (5) 34 35 69 (5)
In Namibia 973(74) 345(26)1318(100) 1009(72) 406(28)1415(100)
In Exile _ 42.5 82.5
Total - - 1.360 - r. 1,497.5
Notes: 1. Districts given name of main town not 'homeland' designation,
2. Includes Oranjemund.
All estimates highly approximate. District estimates 
rounded to nearest 000.
B. Sex/Age Distribution




0 - 6 10.5 11
7 - 1 7 14 15.5
18+ 26.5 25
Men 49 48.5
0 - 6 10.5 11
7 - 1 7 14 14.5
18+ 24.5 23
Total 100 100
0 - 6 21 22
7 - 1 7 28 30
18+ 51 48
Note: Estimated from National Atlas South West Africa
Sections 40 and 42-51; Rivers, B Namibia: An Energy Survey, 
UNDTCD, NAM/79/001, New York, 1985; Fragmentary reports on 
local employment, population situations. Subject to wide 




Labour Force 1977 - 1985
Economically Active1 
SWATF/Police2







500,000 40 600 ,000
7,500 1 15 ,000
565,000 45 675 ,000
72 ,500 6 65 ,000
65 ,000 5 60,000
42,500 85 ,000
1,252 ,500 100 1,500,000
90 1985 90
40 640,000 40
1 20 ,000 1






1. Includes unemployed, underemployed.
2. Under 15 plus full time students 15 and over.
3. Pensioners and other aged not economically active.
4. Not economically active means urban spouse not earning significant
income outside household.
5. Fall in numbers relates to increased living cost limiting ability to 
survive on pensions and on male employee's pay, also fall in number of 
white households.
All estimates highly approximate.
Sources; UNIN (1978); W. Van Ginneken, "Incomes and Wages in Namibia", IL0, 
Geneva, 1985; Table 3 SWAPO, To be Born a Nation, ZED, New 
York/London, 1981.
Table 3
Economically Active Population 1977 ~ 1985
Category 1977 90 1983 90 1985 90
Core Employment^ 187,500 38 176,000 295 170,500 26
pSemi Formal Employment 10.500 2 18.500 3 21 ,000 3
Small Agriculture 240,000 48 300,000 50 311,000 49
Domestic Service 40,000 8 35,000 6 35,000 6
Informal/Unemployed^ 22 ,000 4 70 ,500 12 102,500
i16
Total 500,000 100 600 ,000 100 640,000 100
Notes; All estimates, except core employment, highly approximate.
1. Formal sector wage/salary employment and formal sector
2. Black businesses with net income at least comparable to lower end of 
wage scale.
3. Informal ’occupations1 yielding less than low wage and less than 
substance plus overt unemployment.
4. Official 1984 estimate 75,000. 1984, 95,000 for unemployment.
5. Official 1984 employment total 157,051.
Sources: Windhoek Advertiser 27 August, 1981 and 24 January 1985, Manpower
Survey 1984; SWA Directorate of Development Co-ordination, 
Windhoek, 1985.
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Skill Levels in Namibian Formal Sector Employment 1985
Table 4
Managerial/Administrative Professional
Sector Black White Total Black White Total
Agriculture N 4,000 4,000 N 1,000 1,000
Forestry - 25 25 - - -
Fisheries - 100 100 - - -
Mining N 500 500 N 1,250 1,250
Manufacturing N 400 400 N 400 400
Water - 100 100 N 100 100
Electricity - 50 50 N 50 50
Construction - 25 25 - 250 250
Transport/Communications N 750 750 N 700 700
Commerce/Accommodation/ 
Finance 100 1 ,000 1 ,100 N 250 250
Health N 100 100 2 ,1 00 800 2 ,900
Education N 100 100 7,150 2 ,650 9 ,800
General Government 500 1,500 2 ,0 00 100 2,900 3 ,000
Other 100 400 500 100 400 500
TOTAL 600 9,425 10,025 9,450 10,350 19,800
Skilled/Para Professional Semi Skilled/Clerical
Sector Black White Total Black White Total
Agriculture 250 500 750 17,500 N 17,750
Forestry 100 25 125 600 - 600
Fisheries N 200 200 600 N 600
Mining 2 ,000 1,750 3,750 6 ,000 N 6,000
Manufacturing 500 300 800 3,500 N 3,500
Water 100 100 200 650 N 650
Electricity 100 100 200 650 N 650
Construction 250 250 500 2,250 N 2 ,250
Transport/
Comunications 1,250 1,500 2,750 7,050 550 7 ,600
Commerce/Accom­
modation/Finance 1,500 2,150 3,650 7,400 600 8 ,000
Health 1,100 100 1 ,200 500 N 500
Education 100 N 100 100 N 3,100
General Government 1,400 1 ,600 3,000 4,000 1,000 5 ,000
Other 200 200 400 600 N 600





Sector Black Total Black White Total
Agriculture 20 ,000 20 ,000 39,000 4,500 43,500
Forestry 800 800 1,500 50 1,550
Fisheries 600 600 1 ,200 300 1,500
Mining 4,200 4,200 12 ,200 3 ,800 16,000
Manufacturing 3,650 3,650 7,650 1,100 8,750
Water 750 750 1 ,500 300 1,800
Electricity 750 750 1,500 200 1,700
Construction 4,750 4,750 7,250 750 8 ,000
Transport/Communications 
Commerce/Accom­
8 ,300 8 ,300 16,600 3,500 20 ,100
modation/Finance 11,000 11,000 20 ,000 4,000 24,000
Health 1,300 1,300 5 ,0 00 1,000 6 ,000
Education 900 900 8,250 2,750 11,000
General Government 13,000 13,000 19,000 7 ,000 26 ,000
Other 500 500 1,500 1 ,000 2,500
TOTAL 69 ,000 19,000 139,000 30,500 169,500
Notes:
N Means negligible
Estimated from sectoral chapters UNIN, 1986; fragmentaray data; 
Manpower Survey 1984 Directorate of Development Coordination, SWA 
Administration, Windhoek 1985.
All estimates approximate and tentative.
i
Table 5
Education/Training Estimates Economically Active Population in Namibia 1 .2
1977 1983 1985























Equivalent 5 ,000 10,000 15 ,000 7,500 19,000 16,000 8,500 11,000 20 ,000
Other Post Primary 5 ,000 7,500 12,500 7,500 7 ,0 00 14,500 9 ,000 7 ,000 16,000
Complete Primary 42,000 7,500 51,500 52,500 5 ,000 57 ,000 60 ,000 6,500 66,500
Substantial
Primary 112,500 Neg 1 112,000 151,500 Neg 1 152,500 170,000 Neg 1 165,000
Negligible or Nil 300 ,000 Neg 1 300 ,000 350,000 Neg 1 350,00 362,000 Neg 1 360 ,000
TOTAL 465,000 35,000 501 ,000 569 ,000 30,000 600,000 610,000 30 ,000 640,000
Notes:
1. All estimates approximate, numbers rounded.
2. Not including Namibians in exile.
3. May be overestimate in formal degree terms. Relates to job levels and older holders may
have more experience/on the job training and less degrees.
4. Significant post secondary education/training (including in-service/part-time) say 12 to
19 months full time equivalent minimum.
5. Form 4 and Form 6 .
6 . Incomplete (less than 4 years) secondary or 12 to 18 months full time equivalent post 
primary other than standard secondary.
7. Four years or more - retained functional literacy. Functional literacy via adult 
education classified here.
8 . Functionally illiterate.
Sources: Estimated from UNIN (1978), Chapter 14; Windhoek Advertiser, 17 January 1985;
National Atlas. Section 72; Fragmentary data.
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Table 6
Economic Activity/Absolute Poverty 1977 ~ 1985 
(As 90 of Economically Active)
Category1
1977 1983 1985







































1. See Table 2 for categories.
2 . 15% 1977 and 10% thereafter assumed to be below absolute poverty line
(real wages rose 1977-83).
3 . 20Í assumed to be below absolute poverty line.
4 . 85% 1977 and 90Í thereafter assumed to be below absolute poverty line,
5 . 80Í assumed to be below absolute poverty line.
6 . 90Í assumed to be below absolute poverty line.
Sources:
UNIN (1986); Fragmentary Income Data from various sources; 1984 Field 
Research by C. Allison.
Table 7
1983 Gross Domestic Product
Sector RSA Estimate Coveraee Adiustment— Revised Estimate %
Agriculture,
Forestry, Fishing,
Hunting 143 95 238 12
Mining ^73 5 478 24
Primary 616 100 716
Manufacturing^ 94 40 134 65
Construction 64 15 79 4
Electricity & Water 61 10 71 _2lSecondary 291 65 284 14
Transport and
Communications 97 23 120 6
Trade & Accom­
modation 235 42 277 14
Financial and
Business Services 125 10 135 7
Other Services 88 30 118 6
General Government 340 25 365 18
885 130 1015 51
Tertiary Sector
GDP (at factor cost) 1720 295 2015 100
Notes:
1. Coverage Adjustment Includes Household Self Provisioning (food, fuel, 
house construction), artisanal - semi-formal - small scale formal 
undercount, domestic service and Walvis Bay.
a. Household Self Provisioning (R 75m)
Crops R 15m Fuel R 15m
Stock R 30m Hunting, Gathering R 5m
Dairy R 15m Stock Losses (-15m)
Primary Sector R 65m
Housing - Estimated on basis 200,000 rural dwellings, 5 year 
average life; R 250 average labour content.
Secondary Sector R 10m
b. Undercount (R 30m)
Artisanal Manufacturing R 10m
Transport R 3 m
Rental/Housing/Rooming and Trade R 17m
c. Domestic Service (R 20m)
35-40,000 at R 500-600
d. Walvis Bay (R 170m)
Fishing R 30m Transport-Coramunications R 20m
Salt R 5m Trade and Accommodation R 25m
Manufacturing R 30m Financial, Business Services R 10m
Construction R 5m Other Services R 10m
Electric/Water R 10m General Government R 25m
2. Includes smelting, refining.
3 . Includes meat packing, fish processing.
Sources: Adapted from Statistical and Economic Review 1984; methodology based
on Green, R. H., et al Namibia: The Last Colony. 19 81; fragmentary and/or 
sectoral data 'subsistence' (self provisioning), forestry, fishing and fish 
processing, port, domestic service.
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Table 8
Domestic and National Product; 19M6 - 1983 (R 000,000)
Year GDP GNP1 GNP as *
1946 22.2 20.4 92*
1950 61.0 46.4 76%
1954 107.2 74.4 70%
1956 141.6 85.1 60%
1958 121.3 83.2 69%
1962 146.7 104.1 71%
1969 368.9 278.0 75%
1977 1135.0 710.0 63%
1983 2000.0 1600-1680 80-84*
1985 2900.0 2250-2400 77-83*
Notes:
1. Methods of estimating factor payments and remittances vary. 1946-62 data
are comparable with each other and probably roughly comparable with 1977
and 1983. 1969 is apparently on a basis likely to increase the GNP/GDP
ratio by a least 5*.
2. Excluding 1969 (see Note 1) the swings correspond to degree of economic
and especially enterprise surplus) buoyancy. This improved steadily over
1946-1957, worsened sharply 1958-60, recovered 1960-1977 and worsened 
radically from 1978 (and especially 1980) onward.
Sources:
a. 1946-1962 Odendaal Report, Pretoria, 1964.
b. 1969 'Desert Deadlock' Financial Mail. 2-III-73.
c. 1977 Table 14, Namibia: The Last Colony (Green, Kiljunen, Kiljunen),
London, 19 81.
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1. Includes depreciation (estimated at R130 million 1977 and R313 million 
1983).
2. Rough estimate. May overstate number of white households. In respect to 
black worker/peasant households, divided households are treated as 
separate units thus adjustment from 6 to 4 average household size.
3. In 1977 basically workers in large mines plus limited number of 
professionals, small businessmen, government employees, large scale 
non-mining enterprise employees. Rapid growth relates to upgrading of 
government black salaries, proliferation Second Tier posts, enterprise 
attempts to be seen as "equal opportunity" employers.
Sources:
1977 adjusted from Table 15 in Green, Kiljunen, Kiljunen; 1983 adjusted 
from 1984 Statistical/Economic Review and 1983/84 Budget to correspond to 
adjusted GDP. Wage/Salary level estimates based on incomplete micro data 
for some categories and posts.
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Non Factor Services 25 55
Imports 650- 1170-
Goods 550 1000
Non Factor Services 100 170
Trade Balance Surplus/(Deficit) 150 (110)
Factor Payments/Remittances 3^0~^20 320-370j,
Recorded Interest/Dividends 140 120
Unrecorded Enterprise Remittances 75-100 50-75
Wage-Salary-Small Business ,
Remittances 125-150 150-175
Basic Current Account Balance (Deficit) (190-270) (430-480)
O
Government/Railways Transfer Receipts  75 625
Capital Account Net Inflow/Outflow 130-210 (35-85)








Increase in RSA Currency .
in circulation (10) (20-3 0)
Change in Net External
Commercial Credit
Outstanding 25 (20-30)
Capital Flight Ncg1 (90-100)
Notes:
1. All estimates adjusted to include Walvis Bay. Goods, non-factor services 
imports, recorded interest/dividends, government/railways transfer 





3. Probably seriously incomplete.
4. Adjusted for probable R20 million underestimation in provision 1983 
official estimates.
5. Not readily separable from enterprise external balance changes.
6. If savings held with Namibian financial institution impossible to 
separate accurately from enterprise external balance changes.
7. Railways R20 million 1977, R70 million 19 8 3. Both government and 
railways include capital account transfers as well as recurrent, 
government transfers include R55 and R275 million for 1977 and 1983 
respectively (adjusted to include all of Namibia).
8 . Includes parastatals other than railways. Includes loan and equity 
capital inflows.
9. Dominated by Rossing/0tjihase mine development.
10. Probably largely mineral exploration.
11. Largely external loan payments by Rossing in 1983•
12. See Notes 5 and 6 . Includes head office account balances of branches.
( ) means increase in net external claims.
13. Because RSA - not Namibian - currency is used in Namibia, increased 
currency circulation de facto represents a capital outflow (purchase of 
external asset).
14. ( ) means reduction in external commercial credit used.
15. ( ) means outflow. Highly speculative and if via shifting financial
institution accounts almost impossible to disentangle from enterprise 
external balance changes.
Sources:
Statistical/Economic Review 1982, 1983; Green, Kiljunen, Kiljunen, 
Namibia: The Last Colony, Tables 14, 17, 20; various micro estimates. In 
both years exports adjusted to include new data on probable tourism
receipts (see Chapter Wildlife and Tourism UNIN, 1986) and to take toll
smelting receipts into account.
Table 10 (continued notes, etc.)
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Table 11
A. Exports: 1977-1983 (R 000,000) 1
1977 1983
Meat Products 15 30
Live Cattle 50 35
Karakul, Wool, Mutton 70 20
Fish Products 65 95
Diamonds 300 250
Uranium Oxide 110 325
Base Metals, Other Metals and
OMinerals, Concentrates 150 220
Other Visible Exports^ 20 30
Exports Non-Factor Services** 25 55
Total 800 1Q60
Notes:
1. Adjusted to include all of Namibia.
2. Includes concentrates, ores, salt.
3. Hides and skins may account for up to 25Í.
4. Includes tourism, business travel, toll smelting, non-Namibian ores.
Sources: Statistical/Economic Review, 1984; Namibia:The Last Colony, Tables
18, 20; Quarterly Economic Review of Namibia, etc. (Economist Intelligence
Unit), various issues 1983, 1984; Financial Mail and Rand Daily Mail, various
issues.
B. Imports: 1977-1983 (R 000,000)
1977 1983
Grain1 5 25
Other Food2 15 30
Passenger Cars 15 30
Other Consumer Goods 1271 (161) 250 (335)
Fuel5 60 275
Other Intermediate Goods^ 1121 (1721) 135 (410)7Transport Equipment 20 30





Table 11 continued 




Other Food 25 5
Automobiles 20 10
Other Consumer Goods 200 50
Fuel 275 -
Other Intermediate Goods 75 60
Transport Equipment 15 15
Other Capital Goods 125 100
Total 760 240
7691 24%2
1. If fuel treated as 50Í other RSA share falls to 63Í.
2. Dominantly Western Europe, North America, Japan, in that order. 
Note: Estimated from import patterns of Botswana, Swaziland.
Exports (Í)
Adjusted to Include 
Recorded Exports Namibian EEZ Fish
Western Europe 33-35 32-34
USA1 22-28 20-26
South Africa 18-20 18-20
Japan 14-16 12-14
Independent Africa 1-2 1-2
Socialist Europe - 5-6
Other 4-6 4-5
Note: 1. Treats diamonds in terms of final destination - most via
RSA, London and often Amsterdam.
Estimated from incomplete micro data on destination of exports.
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Table 12
A. 1983 /84 Consolidated Territorial Budget (R 000,000)^
Total Expenditure 1,300 Total Finance 1,3'
Recurrent 1,050 Revenue 7506
Capital 200 Gap 500
By Category By Category
Second Tier Indirect (360)
Central Budget 285 Custom Excise 275
Own Revenue 2150 Sales Tax 85
Central Admin'stn. 40 Direct (215)
'Debt' Service 76 Mining Taxes 75
Other Financial
f
Other Company tax 35
Transfers 79 Dividend Remittance Tax 10
Defence 713 Personal Income Tax 1457
Police 533 Other (175)
Agriculture 70 Service Charges and Rates 140
Transport 91 Fees, Licences, etc. 35
Water 56 Subtotal 750
Education 42 (122 )4 RSA Transfer 275
Health 32 (8 2 ) 4 Borrowing 195
Walvis Bay 114 Residual 30
Other^ 141 Total 1 ,300
Total 1 LO O O
Notes:
1. Adjusted to cover Walvis Bay plus Second Tier and Municipal expenditure 
from own revenue.
2. Dominantly white Second Tier and Windhoek.
3. Excludes expenditure on RSA Budget. Also excludes 'home guards' etc., on 
second tier budgets.
4. Including 'Second Tier'funding purportedly spent on these heads.
5. Includes municipal budget guesstimates.
6 . Includes Walvis Bay, Second Tier, Municipal.
7. Collected by Second Tier. Indirect tax revenue is aggregated into RSA 
Revenue Estimates.
Sources: 1983/84 Budget Estimates adjusted on the basis of fragmentary data
on Second Tier, Municipal, Walvis Bay expenditure and revenue; Thomas, W. H., 
"Namibia 1985: A New Start", address 3-VI-85 at Klein Windhoek.
continued....... /(2)
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Table 12 continued (2)
B. 1984-851
Expenditure
Second Tier Central Budget
2Own Revenue 
Central Administration 




National Education (135)^ 

















Other Company Tax 
Personal Income Tax 
















































1 - 6 . See 12A.
7. Excludes Opening Surplus, RSA Transfers, Loans Raised.
Sources: See 12A and Dirk Mudget, Budget Speech, 5-VII-85.
Table 12 continued (3)
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